The first D-Day - was Operation Torch the turning point in World War Two?

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Introduction

Operation Torch (Torch) was the invasion of North Africa by the Allies in early November 1942, importantly it was the first military engagement by US in WW2 outside the Pacific. Along with Allied invasions of Southern Italy and the South of France, Torch is often overlooked when compared to Operation Overlord, the Normandy D-Day landings of June 1944. However, Torch was not just a question of the US sending an army to war; this was an overwhelming change in US Foreign Policy. This change not only took the US into the European war by the creation of the Allies but ironically delivered post war peace to Europe. Torch was the culmination of a series of political and strategic actions over previous years and lessons learned from Torch were vital to the success of the Allies in the European war.

US Foreign policy can be seen as operating on two levels. Firstly, Macro, the big hard decision and secondly, Micro, the soft decisions chiefly around diplomacy. The US was successful with its Macro strategies. Macro politically was the creation of the Allies and going to war; economically was the creation of an Arms Trade and militarily raising a new army for the war. But it wasn't as simple as that, the Micro policy included negotiations with Vichy France and the post invasion planning of what to do next. The US was successful with its Macro policies, but it can be argued that it failed with its Micro.

By November 1942 Britain and its empire was losing the war and needed to stem the tide of defeats. Britain was weak economically and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill was in a difficult position; he needed to produce some good news for the nation and to maintain his political support. From the outbreak, Churchill was desperate for America to enter WW2 on the British side.

The US entered WW2 following Pearl Harbor in December 1941 fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. President Franklyn D. Roosevelt had not committed US forces to Europe despite Hitler declaring war on the USA at the same time as Pearl Harbor. The USA had been supporting Britain with war materiel since early in the war, but by 1942 Roosevelt knew he would bring US into the European war; it was just a matter of timing.

Germany was clearly winning the war by 1942 with successes in Western Europe, the North African desert, the Atlantic and Russia with Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

Barbarossa had taken Russia by surprise, particularly as there was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Russia was in danger of being defeated. There were huge casualties on both sides and in November 1942 the Battle of Stalingrad was at its hight.

Italy joined Germany to form the Axis and was active in Southern Europe and North Africa. Mussolini thought that Italy had a right to control the Mediterranean. With Germany, Italy experienced success in the North African desert through 1941 and 1942.

Japan declared war on the USA with the air raid on Pearl Harbor. The USA was taken by surprise, along with the European countries with interests in the Pacific as Japan invaded the region. By November 1942, US forces had raised a counterattack and were engaged in the Battle of Guadalcanal and this overshadowed Torch in the USA.

A successful Torch was important to Britain as the British war effort needed a victory, because by early 1942, the British war was particularly disastrous in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Britain had suffered major setbacks with the Axis invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, which gave Axis control of the Sicilian Straights, effectively cutting the Mediterranean in half. This, along with the losses in December 1941 of HMS Queen Elizabth and HMS Valliant both sunk by Italian midget submarines at Alexandria, the Mediterranean home of the Royal Navy, meant that British convoys could not travel safely west to east, and the Royal navy could not protect shipping from East to West.

In the cat and mouse war, of victories and defeats, in the North African desert the German Afrika Korps commanded by Rommel was successful; threatening both Cairo, the headquarters of the British army and Alexandria. "Defeat is one thing, disgrace is another" was how Churchill described the humiliating surrender of Tobruk. Additionally, Britain was in a precarious position in Syria and Iraq, vital at that time for its oil supply. There were serious concerns in both Parliament and the country that the British Army was badly led, had poor equipment and lacked fighting spirit.

The situations on the Oceans were not any better. The Battle of the Atlantic was not going well; there were heavy losses of merchant shipping and crews. The tide of the U-Boat war only began to turn from 1943 with improved Royal Navy technology, tactics with air cover. Also, the "Chanel dash" through the Straits of Dover by three German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen from their Atlantic base of Brest to German and Norwegian waters was a serious embarrassment.

Another embarrassment was the disastrous loss of Singapore where the numerically superior British defensive force surrendered to a smaller Japanese invading army. This proved, along with the losses of two battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse off Malaya, that the "Singapore System" for the defence of Singapore had failed. This left the Royal Navy without a base to protect British interests from India to Australia and the confidence in Britain's ability to protect and defend the Empire was dwindling.

A successful Torch with US forces entering the war to fight alongside British would raise morale in Britain and offer some hope to the population for victory, but it wasn't as simple as that.

The US Foreign Policy of isolationism had to change before the US could enter the war

America was the richest country in the world following WW1 and retreated into isolationism, did not join the League of Nations, supported the Kellogg Briand Act of 1928 and was officially neutral when WW2 broke out. The Johnson Act of 1934 denied the extension of credit to any foreign power. The US Neutrality Acts as late as 1938, were designed to prevent the US from supplying materiel to any country at war.

America saw France as its main European ally and had confidence in the French army to maintain a deterrent for mainland Europe with the Maginot Line. The fall of France in six weeks gave America a huge shock for its own security. America expected a war between France and Germany to be more protracted with the French army to put up more

resistance, giving the US more time to prepare for a war. There was no treaty between France and America but this foreign policy effectively trusted US security to a third party[1].

This unofficial trust can be seen as the American justification for maintaining a small standing army. In 1939, restricted by a 1920 Act of Congress, the US peacetime army was less than 200,000[2] ranking 17th in the world. After twenty years of stagnation, it was too small even to provide a home defence. Congress cut the army budget again by 10% in April 1940. This failure of US foreign policy is significant for Torch. Anticipating that the US might be drawn into another war, in September 1939, Roosevelt appointed General George Marshall as head of the US army; his immediate job while the US remained neutral was to recruit a new force before the US could enter any war. However, his early plans for the expansion of the army were viewed as aggressive by US public opinion and the media[3].

As with Britain, the US navy was the senior service but the Washington conferences had levelled the playing field between USA, Britain, Japan and France, putting Britain at a global disadvantage. Britain needed to support a fleet for the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the Far East whereas America predominantly had to defend the Atlantic on the Eastern seaboard and also the Pacific to a lesser extent. America feared that if Britain and France were defeated, not only would the natural security provided by the Atlantic disappear, Europe would be dominated by Germany with a possible global alliance with Japan. Alternatively, if Germany was ultimately defeated by Russia, a post-war Europe would be dominated by communism bringing about the destruction of capitalism.

In addition to international concerns there were issues at home for Roosevelt who was re-elected for his second term in 1936. His presidency was marred by Congress blocking some of his reforms to "The New Deal" and the economy went into recession in 1937 and 1938 when US GDP declined by 10%, unemployment was over 20% and industrial production declined by 32%. [4] Eventually Roosevelt moved American policy to support the Allies "short of war" and he persuaded Congress to revise the Neutrality Acts in November 1939 to repeal the arms embargo so that America could supply arms to Britain and France[5].

The influence of Churchill and Roosevelt on the creation of the Allies.

Churchill considered it vital to get the US on the British side in Europe as soon as possible after the outbreak of war and not just militarily with boots on the ground but also economically and politically. In a war of economies, the British Empire needed the might of the USA for support. By comparison, Germany was expanding territorially by invading eastwards to gain land and natural resources and also use slave labour for both manufacturing and defensive construction such as the Atlantic Wall.

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[1] Neiberg, Michael S., When France Fell, Harvard University Press, 2021, Pages 7 to 13

[2] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 77

[3] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 77 to 81; Anne O'Hare McCormick, writing for the New York Times, typically reflected US public opinion during World War 2

[4] https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/recession-of-1937-38#:~:text=Lasting%20from%20May%201937%20until,recessions%20of%201920%20and%201929.&text=The%201937%20recession%20occurred%20during%20the%20recovery%20from%20the%20Great%20Depression

[5] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 79 to 80

But it wasn't as simple as that. To reach the point of a joint military invasion in November 1942 was the culmination of a "Special Relationship" between Churchill and Roosevelt. This "Special Relationship" continued into the post war world and was stressed by administrations such as Reagan and Thatcher and Bush and Blair. Begun by Roosevelt, in September 1939, it developed over five and a half years until his death in 1945. This "Special Relationship" established a strong personal and informal relationship via a large communication of letters, telegrams and meetings in the USA.

In a non-digital age, the exchange between Churchill and Roosevelt was no small communication, Churchill sent 944 letters and telegrams while Roosevelt sent 743[6], importantly, it allowed Roosevelt to gain a first-hand appreciation of the war in Europe whilst still officially neutral.

Considering that they were major statesmen and both came from famous families; Churchill and Roosevelt were very different. Roosevelt who came from a wealthy family, which included his cousin President Teddy Roosevelt, qualified as a barrister and pursued a political career. Significantly, the US Chiefs of Staff thought that Roosevelt had no appreciation of Grand Strategy and there was criticism from both Britain by Ian Jacob[7] and the US from Major Albert C Wedemeyer[8]. Marshall thought Roosevelt "charming, organisationally haphazard, brilliant and extremely wily – needed careful handling"[9]. However, Roosevelt understood that air power was going to be more important than in any previous war[10].

By comparison, Churchill came from the great British military Marlborough family with an upbringing of great tradition and privilege and was fascinated by soldiering and Grand Strategy from an early age. He began his career as a journalist adventurer[11] before going into politics. Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said Churchill believed he was a military genius[12] but had a "fertile imagination"[13]. Churchill had a reputation for being impulsive and a risk taker, at one time the Admiralty thought Churchill "To behave like a bully", "Absolutely unreliable" and "Quite unscrupulous"[14]. He was sacked from the Cabinet as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1916 after the Dardanelles campaign and the Gallipoli disaster. As Chancellor of the Exchequer in the early 1920's, his defence cuts were responsible for the ultimate loss of Singapore in early 1942. His "Wilderness years" between 1929 and 1939 were when he was out of office and opposed appeasement.

Roosevelt and Churchill shared an appreciation of naval issues, Roosevelt was a junior under-secretary to the US navy in WW1 whilst Churchill returned to the British Cabinet as First Sea Lord on 3rd September 1939 and Churchill signed himself "Former naval person" to Roosevelt [15]. Roosevelt respected Churchill and found him intellectually stimulating, which may have been due to a perception of Churchill having a wider world view

[6] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 34
[7] See Appendix 2.1
[8] See Appendix 2.2
[9] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 31
[10] ibid, Pages 17 to 20
[11] https://www.nationalCHURCHILLmuseum.org/winston-CHURCHILL-early-life.html
[12] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 40;
[13] See Appendix 2.3
[14] Pound to Keyes 10th August 1927, as referenced in John Maurer, "Winston has gone mad": Churchill, the British Admiralty and the rise of Japanese Naval Power, Journal of Strategic Studies, December 2012, page 783
[15] http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/ANGLO.HTML

compared to the limited US foreign policy. Churchill may have been attracted to Roosevelt because he had the support of a government that Churchill did not have. For public relations, Roosevelt thought Churchill was an ideal person to work with on a war effort as he was popular with the American press presenting the image of Britain standing alone against a Nazi onslaught[16].

The only four term president, Roosevelt, a Democrat, was a very popular president whereas Churchill, who switched from Liberal to Conservative for his career expediency, was not elected Prime Minister by a General Election[17]. Elections were suspended in Britain during the war and there was a government of National Unity for the duration. Churchill was not universally popular in Parliament and even faced a vote of no confidence in 1942. Where Roosevelt may have been weak on miliary strategy he was a shrewd political operator, always keeping an eye on public opinion. In 1942, Roosevelt wanted American troops into combat against the Germans before the mid-term elections of November 1942 to maintain his popular appeal with his electorate. The consequences of this could have been that if Roosevelt lost control of Congress and the isolationists and Republicans took control, the agreed policy of "Germany first" would be under threat[18] with US forces deployed against Japan. The "Special Relationship" was very influential on the changing of US foreign policy. Before 1942, acting as a neutral country, US had already been supporting Britain in the war with its Arms Trade and a series of, often secret, diplomatic meetings.

The US change of foreign policy - Economically - the creation of an Arms Trade

When Churchill replaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister on 10th May 1940 his first letter to Roosevelt famously asked for "Forty or Fifty of your older destroyers" but also contained a long list of other requests. Additionally, Churchill also requested US "Non-Belligerency" and for the US "to keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific using Singapore in any way convenient". Against all these bullish requests SWR outlined the dire state of the war in Europe and significantly that Britain didn't have much money left to pay[19]. This exchange took place before the evacuation at Dunkirk during late May and early June 1940 after which Britain needed replacement weaponry even more urgently.

But it wasn't as simple as that. Roosevelt's immediate response was not optimistic; he replied that he needed to balance Churchill's requests against the requirements of the US[20] and he didn't rush in with commitment. At that early time, Roosevelt's lack of enthusiasm might have been influenced by Churchill's honest negativity with the possibility that Britain was likely to be defeated. Joe Kennedy, US ambassador in London supported this pessimistic outlook. Additionally, Roosevelt may not have appreciated Churchill's tone of demands and instructions.

Roosevelt had difficulty getting these requests through Congress but he eventually convinced Congress that the requested weapons he wanted to supply were "surplus" war

[16] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 27
[17] CHURCHILL, Winston, The Second World War, Chartwell Edition volume 1, The Educational Book Company, 1954 Pages 516 to 523
[18] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 199
[19] CHURCHILL, Winston, The Second World War, Chartwell Edition volume 2, The Educational Book Company, 1954 Pages 20 to 21.
[20] FDR Library, Map Room Papers 1941 – 1945, Series 1 (Messages) Box1

materiel. The old destroyers were transferred under the "Bases for Destroyers" deal, where they were exchanged for 99-year leases on the British naval bases in Bermuda, the Caribbean and Newfoundland[21].

To sidestep the Neutrality Acts the additional arms were sold to US private companies as war surplus and then sold Cash & Carry to Britain.[22] The terms of Cash & Carry were that orders had to be transported by British ships, paid for in full, in advance with gold, securities or dollars, but by December 1940 all Britain's reserves were used up. Critically, Britain was then dependant on the US for the continuation in the war[23]. Roosevelt introduced Lend-Lease which ensured that a bankrupt Britain[24] could continue in the war.

In December 1940, Roosevelt in one of his "fireside chats" to the American public, outlined his plans for Lend-Lease, that America was to become "the Arsenal of Democracy". The plans were controversial and stimulated heated debate[25]. Lend-Lease[26] set up a system that would allow the United States to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed "vital to the defence of the United States"[27]**.** It took Roosevelt three months to get the Lend-Lease Act through Congress[28]. It created a business through the "Special Relationship" which had to be expanded to work at lower levels in the respective administrations and where both parties had to be satisfied with the design and quality of the goods. Whilst essential to Britain it was extended to Russia, delivered by the Royal Navy.

US foreign policy directly influenced US domestic policy as the US domestic economy was transformed quickly to a full-on war machine, powered by Lend-Lease and included food and raw materials in addition to weapons. Subsequently, most of US industry was focused on war production. Major companies such as Ford and Chrysler built tanks and aircraft, shipyards built warships, steel works produced huge quantities of steel to fulfil orders and massive centres of war production sprung up across America. This caused a population migration where by 1945, approximately 15m people were living in a different county to where they were in 1940[29]. The domestic front was also subject to rationing[30] of food and scarce raw materials. By the end of the war, America had supplied to its allies 37,000 tanks, 800,000 trucks, nearly 2,000,000 rifles and 43,000 planes[31].This was the economy that Churchill recognised was needed to advance the war to an Allied victory[32]. The US Arms Trade represented a significant change in US foreign policy; from an inward-looking isolationist country to a supporter of an ally's war effort.

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[21] https://www.roberthjackson.org/article/destroyers-for-bases-agreement-september-2-1940/
[22] See Appendix 2.4
[23] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 114 to 116; Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Pages45 to 46
[24] https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act#:~:text=Passed%20on%20March%2011%2C%201941,defense%20of%20the%20United%20States.%22
[25] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 116
[26] https://www.fdrlibrary.org/lend-lease
[27] https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act#:~:text=Passed%20on%20March%2011%2C%201941,defense%20of%20the%20United%20States.%22
[28] See Appendix 2.5
[29] Englund, Peter, November 1942, Penguin Random House, 2023, Page 101
[30] ibid, Pages 159 to 160 and 320 to 322
[31] Atkinson, Rick, An Army at Dawn, Abacus Books, 2004, page 7
[32] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 117 to 118

There had to be a direct line between the "Special relationship", Lend-Lease and the entrance of America into the European war but it can be argued that this was for any one of a number of reasons. Firstly, militarily; to defeat Fascism by defending Europe against being overrun by a totalitarian regime, to preserve British and particularly American interests and eventually against Japan in the Far East. Secondly, socially; to loyally support an English-speaking nation with a "shared past". Thirdly, economically; that the USA used WW2 for profit, to build the wealth which provided the stimulus for a US recovery from the 1938 recession. An Allied victory would ensure the US got paid for billions of dollars of Lend-Lease. If Britain had been defeated or surrendered, US would never have been paid, which could have reversed the USA into another depression. There is an argument that along with the Oil industry, Lend Lease, drove US post war prosperity. On the other hand, Britain was allowed to run up astronomical Lend-Lease debt to be paid after the war. It delivered a steam of foreign currency repayments to the US for over sixty years, Britain finally paid off Lend-Lease debts in 2006[33] . There can be no doubt that the US supplying arms to Britain and Russia were big business transactions rather than America being a Good Samaritan.

The US change of foreign policy - Politically - away from isolationism

As early as 1936 there had been joint talks about cooperation between US and British navies in the Pacific. Fresh talks, in strict secrecy, aimed at preparing the way for the US entry into the war began in London in August 1940. At that time it was a difficult line for the British to tread; their objective was to encourage America to join the war whilst, at the same time they needed to impress the dire British situation but also the British confidence to win the war[34]. As a consequence, in October 1940, the US recognised that the security of America required the survival of Britain, but also to avoid any confrontation with Japan[35]. Four years earlier Japan had invaded China and was seen as a threat to US and European interests in the Pacific.

Until the end of March 1941, there were another fourteen highly secret but formal sessions in Washington, known as the ABC-1 Staff Talks, which adopted the "Broad Strategic Objective" of "Germany First". Significantly, the US[36] and British[37] delegations agreed that their Chiefs of Staff should continue to meet officially in both Washington and London[38]. Slowly a plan was being developed for the possible entry of the US into the war.

Churchill and Roosevelt first met on 9th August 1941 at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland and at this first high-level meeting, each country brought a high-powered delegation[39]. The conference developed "Germany First"[40] which made military sense for three reasons. Firstly, Germany was the common enemy for a British/US alliance. Secondly, if the war had continued to go badly for both Britain and Russia, both fighting the Axis alone whilst America fought Japan alone, there was a strong possibility that by the time Japan was defeated, America would be left to fight Germany alone. Thirdly, unless the Germans were put on to the defensive quickly, there was the chance that they would make

[33] https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/world/that-debt-from-1720-britains-payment-is-coming.html#:~:text=It%20was%20not%20until%202006,was%20owed%20by%20other%20nations.
[34] See Appendix 2.15
[35] See Appendix 2.18
[36] See Appendix 2.19
[37] See Appendix 2.20
[38] Atkinson, Rick, An Army at Dawn, Abacus Books, 2004, page 10; Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 118 to 120
[39] See Appendix 2.7
[40] See Appendix 2.8

advances through the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to connect with the Japanese possibly in India, which would make them a very difficult proposition to defeat.[41] Significantly, support for Russia "on a gigantic scale" was discussed[42] for the first time and the Arctic Convoys began delivering Lend-Lease in October 1941. The conference ended without any indication of when or how the US might enter the war, but that it might happen at some point.

Pearl Harbor had instantly changed the USA attitude to the war, from isolationism and neutrality to entering the war as the senior Allied power with all the industrial might essential to win the war. US foreign policy had completed its transformation from peacetime to a fully blown war combatant. Churchill immediately invited himself and his team[43] to Washington for probably the most important meetings of the war, the Arcadia Conference in December 1941. Churchill used his growing personal relationship with Roosevelt to formulate joint Allied strategy before US policy overtook British interests. Importantly for Britain Churchill convinced Roosevelt about the benefits of Torch to the war for three reasons. Firstly, it would create a diversion of Axis forces away from the Eastern Front; secondly, it would support the British 8th army in the eastern Mediterranean and finally it would provide a base for future invasions of southern Europe.

Perhaps most significantly, Arcadia agreed that a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCOS) was to be established and based in Washington whilst the US continued planning and training an army which would ultimately be posted to Britain[44]. Finally, Roosevelt told his COS that he wanted US troops in combat within twelve months[45] a firm commitment to the new Alliance. The conference concluded without full approval for Torch and the final decision was still to be argued over but the plan for US to enter the European war was taking shape.

On 19th August 1942, Churchill and Roosevelt met again at the Argonaut Conference which was overshadowed by the news that Tobruk had fallen. However, that defeat appeared to strengthen the Allied relationship but the arguments within the JCOS on the best way to prosecute the war were becoming apparent.

The US change of Foreign Policy - Militarily - politics and military collide.

As head of JCOS, Marshall proposed a unity of command for each theatre with a single supreme commander over the army, navy and air force, which was accepted by the British.[46] In early August, the British accepted Dwight D Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander[47] but with Mark Clark as his deputy[48]. The appointment of Clark rather than

[41] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 26
[42] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 53
[43] See Appendix 2.9
[44] Funk, Arthur Layton, The Politics of Torch, the University Pres of Kansas, 1974, Page 32
[45] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 34
[46] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 67
[47] Telegrams between Dill and CHURCHILL and CHURCHILL and Roosevelt on 30th July to 1st August 1942, CHURCHILL, Winston, The Second World War, Chartwell Edition volume 4, The Educational Book Company, 1954 Pages 351 to 352; Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Pages 261 to 262; Reference CAB 79/56/82, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023; approval of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander and Torch absolute priority.
[48] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 188; Reference CAB 79/56/84, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023; Section 2.c Deputy Commander should be American.

a British officer, cannot be underestimated for Britain as the command of the invasion forces was relinquished to the US for the rest of the war. To achieve Torch before November 1942 Eisenhower, who did not have combat experience, used his administrative excellence[49] to establish his Allied Forces Headquarters and impose the American Staff system[50]which became the template for the rest of the war. But it wasn't as simple as that. The decisions taken at Arcadia and Argonaut were primarily made by the politicians, but it was their respective militaries that had to make it work and there was conflict between the policy makers and the strategists.

There were significant differences on how "Germany First" should be achieved. Within the US COS, views varied from "Japan First" to "Germany First" and they did not include the invasion of North Africa. Eisenhower prepared the Marshall Memorandum[51], a three-pronged plan for "Operations in Western Europe". Firstly, Bolero, the build-up of US troops in Britain to be available for two operations against Germany in France named Sledgehammer and Roundup. Secondly, if a Soviet collapse was imminent, Sledgehammer was an emergency assault on Cherbourg to distract Hitler from the Eastern Front. Finally, Roundup, which was a full-scale invasion of France in 1943, which ultimately became Overlord in 1944. It is fair to say in March 1942 that there was general anti-British feeling in the JCOS who wanted "Germany First" to be Roundup or Sledgehammer.

But it wasn't as simple as that. In the US, Marshall was against Torch and argued for a European strategy while Eisenhour favoured the Pacific. The British argued that Torch was the only viable opportunity in 1942, firstly, the US did not have an army ready for an invasion of Western Europe; secondly that there were not enough Royal Navy ships or landing craft to carry out Roundup and thirdly the US COS were divided, split between the army who favoured a war in Europe and the navy who wanted a war in the Pacific[52].

There were many threats and arguments by Marshall but eventually, when he was negotiating in London, Roosevelt called his bluff[53] and restricted his options so that only Torch was viable to meet all the criteria defined by Roosevelt. In Washington, Roosevelt told the remaining COS; that as Commander-in-Chief, a rank he did not invoke often, that he had made the decision for Torch and to go ahead at the earliest possible date[54]. Roosevelt had outmanoeuvred Marshall[55] to impose US foreign policy on the US military. He sent a celebratory telegram to Churchill [56].

[49] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 49

[50] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 195 to 201

[51] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Pages 52 to 53; Buchanan, Andrew, American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, 2014, page 38; Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Pages 129 to 133; Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 168 to 169; Perry, Mark, Partners in Command, The Penguin Press, 2007 pages 73 to 77

[52] Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 170 to 174

[53] Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Pages 97 to 98; Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 185

[54] Funk, Arthur Layton, The Politics of Torch, the University Pres of Kansas, 1974, Page 86; [54] Atkinson, Rick, An Army at Dawn, Abacus Books, 2004, page 16

[55] Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Pages 251 to 256

[56] Telegram between Roosevelt and CHURCHILL 28th July 1942, CHURCHILL, Winston, The Second World War, Chartwell Edition volume 4, The Educational Book Company, 1954 Page 351.

Why what was happening in Russia was so important to Torch

By 1942, Russia was mounting a heroic defence against the overwhelming odds of Operation Barbarossa and there as was widespread support for the Russian people from the British population. The political situation was delicate and the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill and Stalin was strained[57] even though Britain was delivering US Lend Lease supplies via the Arctic Convoys from October 1941. The Soviet army in the East was taking a beating and Stalin wanted Roundup to relieve the pressure on his forces and create a distraction for German forces. The Allied argument against this was that a D-Day in 1942 would have been disastrous with defeat almost certain as the German army was still strong enough to be transported quickly by train across Europe from East to West to defeat an invasion and push the Allies back into the sea. Churchill travelled to Moscow and convinced Stalin that Torch was the best way forward even though the Arctic Convoys were to be suspended as Royal Navy ships were diverted for Torch[58]. It is questionable if any Axis forces were transferred to combat Torch.

Invasion takes place – but it wasn't as simple as that

It was agreed that Torch would be American led[59] with a mainly US army, delivered and protected by the Royal Navy and the RAF. But it wasn't as simple as that. Torch was very complicated but planned very quickly. Eisenhower, whilst navigating the politics of the JCOS, faced an enormous task. He had serious problems for an invasion over a long distance and across three beachheads[60], particularly the availability of merchant shipping to transport the invasion force, the Royal Navy to protect the invasion fleet[61], air support[62], landing craft and the mainly US "rookie" army. The invasion force of approximately 100,000 troops sailed in two task forces from both the USA and Britain and were embarked directly from their transport ships on three locations: Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Torch was the biggest seaborne invasion up to that time; it was ultimately successful but not without mistakes and costly errors, but lessons were learned. Most significantly, America had entered the European war and US foreign policy had completely changed direction, doing a 180 degree turn in a few years.

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[57] Reference FO/954/18B/277, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023. Dill to CHURCHILL re Roosevelt and Litvinoff

[58] Redford, Duncan and Grove, Philip, The Royal Navy since 1900, 2014, page 154; Reference CAB 79/87/12, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023. Convoys to Russia, Pound and CHURCHILL.

[59] Buchanan, Andrew, American grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, page 68

[60] Reference CAB 79/56/88, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023; Cabinet to Eisenhower, outline Torch plans and future of Roundup and Sledgehammer.

[61] Reference FO 954/188/398, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023; Reallocation of ships needed for Torch

[62] Reference CAB 79/56/83, The National Archives, Kew, accessed 02/08/2023, Air Force command and Support

The new US foreign policy was confusing – difficult relations with Vichy France

The macro US foreign policy of entering the war had been achieved but it wasn't as simple as that, the micro foreign policy had yet to be tested. The biggest issue was that Torch was not an invasion in Europe but Africa, onto a territory of Vichy France, officially neutral, that had been a British ally at the start of the war and not defended by the Axis. If the politics between the JCOS were difficult in preparation for Torch, the politics and the micro US foreign policy between the Allies and Vichy for Eisenhower were just as complicated. But it wasn't as simple as Vichy alone, there were other factions. Firstly, there was the Free French led by General de Gaulle and secondly the French Nationalists led by General Giraud[63] and this is without considering other factions such as the communists. US and British foreign policy were in direct conflict. Britain recognised the Free French in London, which the US administration tried to discredit them as dangerous revolutionary radicals and allies of Communism[64]. Additionally, a sizable proportion of Free French was Jewish and the antisemitic Vichy used this as a reason to oppose them[65]. The US recognised Vichy as the legal government of France and a buffer against the growth of communism and social radicalism[66]. William Bullitt, Roosevelt's US ambassador to France, feared uprisings throughout Europe[67].

However, US Foreign policy could be seen as contradictory, the US was invading a country that it was supplying via a trade deal with humanitarian and food aid; but Vichy was a fascist regime collaborating with the Nazis carrying out policies for the transportation and imprisonment of French Jews and anti-Nazis such as European intellectuals and political prisoners, along with the forcible relocation of French workers to the German war effort. Evidence proves that the US State Department could not deny knowledge of these activities, through the humanitarian work of Americans; such as Varian Fry who was supported by Eleanor Rosevelt. The lack of full support by the State Department to these organisations could lead to an accusation of antisemitism at the State Department.

But it wasn't as simple as that; to put this into context for that time, there was no concept of "International Law". This meant that a nation could act as it wished within its borders, without the fear of overseas condemnation or intervention; effectively legitimising the persecution of its minorities. Antisemitism had been widespread throughout Europe throughout history but grew from the late 19th century; it was not invented by the Nazis; they just perfected it. Diplomatically the US would not condemn or intervene in the affairs of Germany, whilst at the same time endorsing its own racial discrimination of its Black population. The concepts of "Crimes against Humanity" and "Genocide" were only defined and accepted towards the end of the war and used at the Nuremberg Trials for the first time[68].

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[63] Neiberg, Michael S., When France Fell, Harvard University Press, 2021, Page 159
[64] Buchanan, Andrew, American grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, pages15 to 16
[65] Thomas, Martin, The French Empire at War 1940-45, Manchester University Press, 1998 page 160
[66] Buchanan, Andrew, American grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, pages13 to 14
[67] Buchanan, Andrew, American grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, page 3 and pages 12 to 13
[68] The works of Hersch Lauterpacht (Crimes against Humanity) and Rafael Lemkin (Genocide) Phillipe Sands, East West Street, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016

Diplomatically it can be argued that America was backing both sides; on one hand supplying aid to a pro German country and covering the opportunity if Germany won the European war; whilst on the other hand planning to defeat the Axis in an alliance with Britain. This was a very precarious relationship; Churchill considered any aid to Vichy to be supporting the enemy[69] and American public opinion was typically against supporting what was reported in the Press as a fascist, antisemitic state.

Presumably unknown to the US, the Vichy government was at the very least opportunistic. Following Pearl Harbor, the Petain government started to negotiate with the Nazis about declaring war against the Allies in return for Vichy concessions. These came to nothing but illustrate what double dealings Vichy were capable of[70].

On top of these difficult political relationships, there were two important questions about Torch and for Eisenhour. Firstly, could the US arrange an invitation from the French for an invasion by an army of liberation? Despite extensive negotiations with both Vichy and the Nationalists, US diplomacy failed and an agreement was not found. Consequently, a muddled invasion went ahead. In some areas the invaders got ashore safely but others were opposed and there were casualties and losses of ships and equipment.

Secondly, If the invasion was opposed by disunified French forces, who could negotiate a ceasefire? It was only after five days from the start of the invasion with confusion on the ground that Eisenhour eventually negotiated a cease fire with Admiral Darlan, a duplicitous representative of Vichy. Under the circumstances of the beachhead conflicts this was a very unsatisfactory situation. Militarily Torch was successful for the Allies but US diplomacy had failed. De Gaulle used the Allies to launch the Free French faction to post war power; the US had backed the wrong side.

Conclusion

Torch was a political and strategic success for Roosevelt and the US and the "Special Relationship" was very influential, but militarily North Africa was not important to the US. First and foremost, American foreign, policy in WW2 changed with the creation of the Allies to support the British Empire and ultimately to supply an economy and an army which would provide the military capability to defeat Nazi Germany on a Western Front.

But it wasn't as simple as that, as the Allies could not afford a fiasco in their first operation. Torch was always going to be a risky operation because there was not enough time for the US to raise and train a new army and for Britain to assemble an invasion fleet. However, at the command level with the JCOS structure, operational lessons were learned about ships, logistics, navigation, weather forecasting etc that were essential for later in the war.

For the ultimate success of D-Day, Torch finally established that any future invasions would have to be beach landings. Strategically, it would have been essential to occupy a port in the initial invasion, so that the follow up supplies would have been landed onto a

[69] CHURCHILL, Winston, The Second World War, Chartwell Edition volume 3, The Educational Book Company, 1954 Pages 100 to 103; Buchanan, Andrew, American grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War 2, Cambridge University Press, pages 26 to 27

[70] Paxton, Robert, O, Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order 1940 – 1944, Columbia University Press, 1972, Appendix A

dock and then distributed by road and rail. Torch finally proved that taking a town was too dangerous, costly and difficult. Subsequently, the Mulberry Harbours were created for D-Day to overcome the lack of a town and its harbour.

It was not only the lack of proper training and rehearsals for the inexperienced US forces where lessons were learned. Logistics in Virginia were poor with ships loaded haphazardly which could not support the ground troops with the equipment, particularly tanks and ammunition, when they urgently needed them[71]. The landing zones were not properly surveyed, and the positions of the tides and the moon and weather conditions were not considered properly. The recognition of these issues provided a template for the planning of future landings, particularly D-Day, making Torch a significant action and instrumental in the success of the Allies in the second World war.

Torch was successful but it did not go to plan, the Allied invasion forces eventually reached Tunisia, to trap and defeat Kesselring's Panzerarmee in a pincer movement with the British Eighth Army from Egypt. Torch also secured a bridgehead in North Africa that the Allies could use as a base for a southern front into Europe to attack the "soft underbelly" of Nazi Germany.

Crucially for both US and British Macro foreign policy there was never a treaty, or anything written down between the Allies. Theoretically US could have walked away at any time, withdrawn support, and left Britain to be defeated; but the Vichy trade deal would have ensured a US relationship with the victors. With Europe and US concerned about the spread of communism throughout the 1930s it is further speculation that due to this lack of a treaty the US could have changed sides and provided Germany with military support and the industrial capacity of Lend-Lease to oppose Russia and communism. After a rough start in 1940, typified by "Pushy Brits" and reluctant Americans, the Alliance worked and it held.

Without a formal treaty, the Allies in 1942 was an ad-hoc alliance, born out of expediency, against known enemies, but it has been influential to the present day. Ironically, post war there is a treaty for NATO, led by US against the perceived enemy of the USSR when no war has ever been declared. Despite some sabre rattling on both sides during a cold war, no shots have been fired in a hot war. A peace has been maintained as US foreign policy to support Europe was clear until the second Trump administration, when it appears to be ad-hoc and possibly unstable. NATO has not been drawn into the Ukraine conflict even though it can be seen as a proxy war between The West and Russia. Stable US European foreign policy has benefited NATO members but in the early to mid-21st century it is open to question whether the economic commitment of the West is sustainable for an undeclared war.

However, it can be argued that the greatest success of US foreign policy was the arms trade. Lend-Lease could be seen as an insurance policy for the US. British survival guaranteed America would get paid for Lend-Lease, but it is speculation that a bankrupt Britain would have had to relinquish territories from the Empire to pay America, as in the Destroyer for Bases deal.

[71] Atkinson, Rick, An Army at Dawn, Abacus Books, 2004, pages 33 to 35

At the macro political, economic and strategic foreign policy level, Torch can be seen as the turning point in the war due to the creation of the Allies and Churchill achieving his long-held wish for US boots on the ground. The micro level of negotiating the conclusion of the invasion and also the management of the invaded territories post invasion did not correspond with the Atlantic Charter devised by Churchill and Roosevelt at Placentia Bay. US Micro foreign policy and diplomacy largely failed. The US can be criticised for a lack of post invasion planning throughout the 20th and 21st centuries; with foreign policy failures after actions such as the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan.

Militarily, North Africa was not strategically important to US and Torch can be seen as a relatively safe entry into the war

Military strategy has moved on since 1945 and it is very unlikely there will ever be another amphibious operation like Torch, the first D-Day, or Overlord the final D-Day. Any future invasion will be led by cyber-attack, economic or climate warfare, expensive missiles & drones; not by potentially heavy loss of life suffered by boots on the ground.

Torch should be seen as a vital event in the European war but here was no single event that can be described as the "turning point in the war". It was a combination of three events at the end of 1942. Firstly, Torch, the first D-Day; secondly, the British 8th Army victory at el Alamein and finally, the Russian victory at Stalingrad which put the German army on the road to total defeat in the East. Together these three were, to borrow from Churchill, "not the beginning of the end of the war, but the end of the beginning". The start of the end was Overlord in June 1944, the final D-Day.

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130	CAB/79/56/82	Appointment of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander
131	CAB 70/56/84	Section 2.c Deputy commander should be American
134	CAB 79/56/88	Eisenhower plans for Torch, and Roundup and Sledgehammer
135	FO 954/188/398	Reallocation of Ships for Torch
136	CAB 79/56/83	Air command and support
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Appendix 1 – Main Personalities in Operation Torch

Not listed on any order:

British

Name	Notes	Website
Sir Winston Churchill	Prime Minister	Sir Winston CHURCHILL
Alan Brooke (Later Lord Alanbrooke)	Field Marshall Commander of General Staff Military advisor to Churchill	Field Marshall Alan Brooke
Sir Dudley Pound	Admiral First Sea Lord	Sir Dudley Pound
Sir Andrew Cunningham	Admiral Naval Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force	Admiral Cunningham
Sir Bertram Ramsey	Admiral Cunningham's deputy	Sir Bertram Ramsey
Earl Louis Mountbatten	Head of Combined Operations Replaced Roger Keys	Earl Louis Mountbatten
Kenneth Anderson	General Commander Eastern Assault Force	General Kenneth Anderson
"Monty" Montgomery	Field Marshall British 8th Army	Field Marshall Montgomery
Sir William Welsh	Air Marshall Commander Eastern Air Command	Air Marshall Sir William Welsh
Sir John Dill	Field Marshall Churchill's Personal representative & Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington - Chief of the British JCOS	Field Marshall Sir John Dill
Sir Hastings Ismay	General Churchill's Principal Staff Officer on COS Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet	General Hastings Ismay
Lord Lothian	British Ambassador to Washington	Lord Lothian
Sir Cyril Newall	Air Chief Marshall	ACM Sir Cyril Newall
Sir Arthur Longmore	Air Vice Marshall C-in-C Middle East until May 1941	AVM Sir Arthur Longmore
Colville Wemyss (Weems)	Head of British Army Mission to Washington Replaced by Sir John Dill	Colville Wemyss

Ian Jacob (Sir)	General Assistant Military Secretary to the British War Cabinet	General Sir Ian Jacob
Michael Dewar	Industrialist Chairman of British Timken, (manufacturers of bearings) Head of the British Ministry of Supply mission Washington in 1940. Supported by Brigadier Douglas Pratt, an expert in British tank requirements, they set up the headquarters of British Army Staff in America	Had to work with the American National Defence Advisory Commission for the US production of a British tank design. Dewar placed orders for over 2,000 tanks, total cost $132m and Britain committed over $16m to build and equip factories to build them. A huge leap of faith for an unproven design. Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 95 to 102
Sir John Wardlaw-Milne	Conservative MP	Sir John Wardlaw-Milne
Leslie Hore Belisha	Liberal MP	Leslie Hore-Belisha
Aneurin Bevan	Labour MP	Aneurin Bevan
Anthony Eden	Conservative MP	Anthony Eden
Clement Atlee	Labour MP	Clement Attlee

American

Name	Notes	Website
Franklin D Roosevelt	US President	FDR
George Marshall	General US Chief of Staff	General George C. Marshall General George Marshall
Dwight D Eisenhower	Supreme Commander Operation Torch	Dwight D Eisenhower
Raymond Lee	General Marshall's Military attaché in London also reported to Roosevelt	
Mark Clark	General Assistant to Eisenhower	General Mark Clark
Harry Hopkins	Chief Foreign Policy advisor and close confident to Roosevelt	Harry Hopkins
Henry Stimson	Secretary of War	Henry Stimson
William J Donovan	Roosevelt's unofficial personal representative in London and North Africa	William J Donovan

Walter Bedell Smith	General Secretary to the JCOS Eisenhower's COS	General Walter Bedell Smith
John Dalquist	General Eisenhower's Assistant COS to Walter Bedell Smith	General John E Dahlquist
Edwin M Watson	General Military aide to Roosevelt	Edwin Watson
Frank Knox	Secretary to the Navy	Frank Knox
George Patten	General Commander Western Assault Force	General George Smith Patton
Lloyd R Fredendall	General Commander Central Assault Force	General Lloyd Fredendall
James Doolittle	General Commander Western Air Command	General James Doolittle
Bonner L Fellers	Major Military Attaché reported to William J Donovan	Major Bonner Fellers
Leslie McNair	General Head of Army Ground Forces Responsible for Training	General Lesley J McNair
Henry "HAP" Arnold	General Head of US Army Air Force	General "Hap" Arnold
Brehon B Somervell	General Head of Army Services and Supply	General Brehon B Somervell
Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stillwell	General US Commander in the Pacific	General Joseph Stilwell
Albert Wedemeyer	General Staff Officer in the War Department	General Albert Coady Wedemeyer
Robert L. Ghormley	Admiral Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations	Admiral Robert L Ghormley
George Veazey Strong	Brigadier General Deputy Chief of the General Staff	General George Strong
Delos C Emmons	General Commanding General of General Headquarters Airforce	General Delos Carleton Emmons
Joe Kennedy	Senator US Ambassador to London	Senator Joseph Kennedy
Robert Murphy	US diplomat Personal representative of Roosevelt in North Africa	Robert Murphy

Harold “Betty” Stark	Admiral	Admiral Harold Rainsford Stark
Sumner Welles	Under Secretary of State	Sumner Welles
Cordell Hull	Secretary of State	Cordell Hull
William Bullitt	US Ambassador to France	William Christian Bullitt Jr.
William Leahy	Admiral	Admiral William Daniel Leahy

French

Name	Notes	Website
Henri Philippe Petain	General Head of the Vichy State	General Philippe Petain
Pierre Laval	Vichy Prime Minister	Pierre Laval
Jean-Francois Darlan	Admiral Minister of Foreign Affairs Prime Minister Second to Petain	Admiral JF Darlan
Maxime Weygand	General Delegate General in North Africa	General Maxime Weygand
Henri Giraud	General	General Henri Giraud
Charles Mast	General Army Chief of Staff in Algiers.	General Charles Mast
Alphonse Juin	General Commander of all Vichy North African land and air forces.	General Alphonse Juin
Charles de Gaulle	General Leader of the Free French	General Charles de Gaulle
Charles Nogues	General	General Charles Nogues

Appendix 2 – Supplementary Footnotes.

2.1	Ian Jacob, assistant military secretary to the British War Cabinet attended Arcadia "The president is a child in military affairs, and evidently has little realisation of what can and cannot be done. He doesn't seem to grasp how backward his country is in war preparations and how ill prepared his army is to get involved in large scale operations". Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 34
2.2	Post war Major Albert C Wedemeyer from the War Plans Department said" that President Roosevelt did not have the knowledge , the military knowledge, the strategic knowledge, that Prime Minister Churchill did. He wasn't in close proximity with the leaders of our Army and Navy. Churchill worked with his Chiefs of Staff and Planners down in his offices and Map Rooms……he supported his chiefs in their negotiations. I am sure it wasn't a question of supporting General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt. He really didn't know enough about it and didn't pretend to" Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 198
2.3	Churchill had a "general dislike for those aspects of reality which impeded his grand design for victory". Alan Brooke wrote in this diary that Churchill's "military plans and ideas varied from the most brilliant conceptions at one end to the wildest and most dangerous at the other……..God knows where we should be without him but God knows where we shall go with him" Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 34
2.4	An early example of the difficulties of supplying weapons were 500,000 Enfield rifles where the .300 calibre of the US rifles were different to British .303 ammunition and they were never fired. Marshall thought that these could have been used for training his army. These deals were a symbolic statement of intent rather than practical use. Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 88 to 92
2.5	Over a period of three months, starting with his State of the Nation address on 6th January 1941, The Lend-Lease Act was passed by Congress on March 11th 1941. The House Foreign Affairs Committee votes 17 to 8 in favour during January; 3rd February goes to House of Representatives, passed on 8th February by 260 to 165 votes; 7th March passed in the Senate by 60 to 31 votes Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, pages 118, 125 and 127
2.7	The US delegation included Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's special representative to Britain; Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State; General George Marshall, Head of the US Army, Hap Arnold, head of the USAAF, Admiral Harold Stark and Admiral Ernest J King. The British delegation included Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound; General Sir John Dill, chief of the Imperial General Staff; Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office; Lord Cherwell, the prime minister's scientific adviser. Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 52
2.8	Other items on the agenda included: Improved Atlantic convoy escorts from the US, US bombers to Britain and the US to take over anti-submarine patrols east of Iceland. Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 53
2.9	The British team on 13th December 1941 left for Washington on the HMS Duke of York and arrived on 22nd December 1941. There were twelve meetings between 24th December 1941 to 14th January 1942 The British delegation included Field Marshall Sir John Dill, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound; Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal and Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook and his doctor Sir Charles Wilson. General Allan Brooke appointed head of General Staff CIGS 1st December 1941, Churchill's right-hand

	man. Brooke was left in London as he was seen as being anti American; he was replaced by Dill who had been working in Washington as Churchill's representative and he had good relationships with senior Americans. Gelb, Norman, Desperate Venture, William Morrow, 1992, Page 24
2.15	Lord Lothian, WO/193/311 "help to bring home to the United States the gravity of the position it stands in itself and the truth that the sooner it throws itself into the business of defending Great Britain the more likely it is to avoid disaster itself" Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 103
2.18	Stark stated "If Britain wins decisively against Germany, we could win anywhere; but……..if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere" Roberts, Andrew, Masters and Commanders, Penguin Books, 2008, Page 45
2.19	The US delegation was: Major General Embick, Brigadier General Miles, Brigadier General Gerow, Colonel McNarny, Rear Admiral Ghormley, Rear Admiral Turner, Captain Kirk, Captain Ramsey, Lieutenant Colonel Pfieffer. "ABC Staff Conversations" Prem3/489/I, TNA In Footnote 18, Chapter 4; Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 118
2.20	The British delegation was: Rear Admiral Bellairs, Rear Admiral Danckwerts, Major General Morris, Air Vice Marshall Slessor, Captain Clarke. "ABC Staff Conversations" Prem3/489/I,TNA In Footnote 18, Chapter 4; Barr, Niall, Yanks and Limeys, Jonathan Cape, 2015, page 118